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THIS ARTICLE contrasts the approaches of the California Evidence
Code ("Evidence Code"), the Federal Rules of Evidence ("Federal
Rules"), and, where pertinent, the Uniform Rules of Evidence to chal-
lenges to the competency of witnesses and to evidence offered to sup-
port or impeach witnesses. In addition, the Article compares the
limitations imposed on the examination of witnesses, including the
judge's power to control the order and mode of interrogating
witnesses.
This Article is part of a larger study commissioned by the Califor-
nia Law Revision Commission ("the Commission") to assess whether
the California Evidence Code should be conformed to the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The Commission was created by the California Leg-
islature in 1953 as the permanent successor to the Code Commission.
Its chief responsibility is to review California statutory and decisional
law to discover defects and anachronisms and to recommend legisla-
tion to make needed reforms.
The fifth paper in the series comprising the study, this Article was
submitted to the Commission on September 1, 2004. The California
and federal provisions compared were in effect as of December 2003.
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this
Article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent or
reflect the opinions, conclusions, or recommendations of the
Commission.
[Vol. 39
I. Competency of Witnesses
A. Competency in General
The Evidence Code and the Federal Rules provide a general rule
of competency.' All persons, irrespective of age, are qualified to be
witnesses unless disqualified by statute. 2 The common law disqualifica-
tions are eliminated. That a witness may be a party, a felon, or related
to a party are now grounds for impeachment, not disqualification as a
witness.3
Under the Evidence Code, individuals are disqualified if they can-
not testify in a manner others can understand or if they cannot appre-
ciate the duty of a witness to tell the truth.4 In addition, witnesses who
do not appear as experts may not testify about a particular matter un-
less they have personal knowledge of the matter. 5
The Federal Rules, like the Evidence Code, require witnesses to
testify under oath or affirmation and, except for experts, on the basis
of personal knowledge.6 The Federal Rules, however, are silent on
whether a witness must testify in a manner understood by the finder of
fact to qualify as a witness. The Federal Rules differ from the Evidence
Code in another respect. They provide that "in civil actions and pro-
ceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which
State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness
shall be determined in accordance with State law. '' 7 Because of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,8 diversity concerns do not arise in matters
litigated in California courts. Therefore, no such provision is neces-
sary in the Evidence Code.
B. Interpreters and Translators
The Evidence Code contains detailed provisions on the qualifica-
tions and use of interpreters for non-English speaking or limited En-
glish speaking witnesses. 9 Interpreters are subject to all the rules of
1. FED. R. EvID. 601; CAL. EVID. CODE § 700 (West 1995).
2. CAL. EVID. CODE § 700.
3. See FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee's note.
4. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 701.
5. See id. § 702.
6. See FED. R. EVID. 602-03.
7. See FED. R. EVID. 601.
8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that "[in federal courts,] [e]xcept in matters gov-
erned by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case
is the law of the state").
9. CAL. EvD. CODE § 752.
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law relating to witnesses. 10 Interpreters must take an oath swearing to
"make a true interpretation to the witness in a language the witness
understands."11 The interpreter must also provide a true interpreta-
tion of the witness's answers. 12 In addition, the Evidence Code re-
quires the appointment of an interpreter for a party who is not
proficient in English in such Family Code proceedings as dissolutions
and legal separations in which a protective order has been granted or
is sought. 13
The Evidence Code also contains detailed provisions on the qual-
ifications and use of interpreters for witnesses who are deaf or hearing
impaired. 14 It also provides for the use of translators whenever a writ-
ing offered in evidence cannot be "deciphered or understood di-
rectly."15 Translators must take an oath to translate accurately into
English any writing they are asked to decipher or translate. 16
In contrast, the Federal Rules have only a single provision relat-
ing to interpreters. Federal Rule 604 provides that an "interpreter is
subject to the provisions of these rules relating to qualification as an
expert and the administration of an oath or affirmation to make a
true translation." 17 California's detailed rules reflect the state's experi-
ence with limited or non-English speaking witnesses and witnesses
with disabilities, and therefore should be retained.
C. Persons Disqualified from Testifying
1. Presiding Judges
The Federal Rules prohibit the judge presiding over the trial
from testifying as a witness.18 No objection needs to be made to pre-
serve the issue for review. 19
The Evidence Code, on the other hand, allows the presiding
judge to testify as a witness if no party objects. 20 Before the presiding
judge may be called as a witness, however, the judge, in a hearing
outside the presence of the jury, must inform the parties of any known
10. Id. § 750.
11. Id. § 751(a).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 755.
14. Id. §§ 751(b), 754-754.5.
15. Id. § 753.
16. Id. § 751(c).
17. FED. R. EVID. 604.
18. FED. R. EVID. 605.
19. Id.
20. CAL. EVID. CODE § 703(d).
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information regarding the matters the judge will testify about.21 If a
party objects to the judge as a witness, the judge may not testify and
must declare a mistrial and order the action to be tried before an-
other judge.22
The Evidence Code expressly allows the parties to make an in-
formed decision on whether to object to the judge as a witness. For
this reason, the provision should be retained.
2. Judges, Arbitrators, and Mediators
The Evidence Code provides:
No person presiding at any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding,
and no arbitrator or mediator, shall be competent to testify, in any
subsequent civil proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, deci-
sion, or ruling, occurring at or in conjunction with the prior pro-
ceeding, except as to a statement or conduct that could (a) give
rise to civil or criminal contempt, (b) constitute a crime, (c) be the
subject of investigation by the State Bar or Commission on Judicial
Performance, or (d) give rise to disqualification proceedings under
paragraph (1) or (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 170.1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. However, this section does not apply to a
mediator with regard to any mediation under Chapter 11 (com-
mencing with Section 3160) of Part 2 of Division 8 of the Family
Code.2 3
The Federal Rules do not have an equivalent provision. The Evi-
dence Code section protects judges, arbitrators, and mediators from
harassment and promotes the stability of their decisions. It should
therefore be retained.
3. Sitting Jurors
Upon objection, a California or federal juror may not testify as a
witness at the trial in which the juror is sitting.24 The Evidence Code,
however, provides:
Before a juror sworn and impaneled in the trial of an action may
be called to testify before the jury in that trial as a witness, he shall,
in proceedings conducted by the court out of the presence and
hearing of the remaining jurors, inform the parties of the informa-
tion he has concerning any fact or matter about which he will be
called to testify. 25
21. Id. § 703(a).
22. Id. § 703(b).
23. Id. § 703.5.
24. FED. R. EVID. 606; CAL. EviD. CODE § 704(b).
25. CAL. EVID. CODE § 704(a).
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The Evidence Code expressly allows the parties to make an in-
formed decision on whether to object to the juror as a witness. If no
party objects, the juror may testify. For these reasons, the Evidence
Code provisions should be retained.
4. Jurors and Post-Verdict Proceedings
In California post-verdict proceedings,jurors may be called to tes-
tify about "statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occur-
ring, either within or without the jury room, of such a character as
[are] likely to have influenced the verdict improperly."26 But to pro-
tect jurors from harassment, jurors may not testify about the effect
such statements, conduct, conditions, or events had in influencing the
jurors to assent or dissent from the verdict or upon the mental
processes by which the verdict was reached. 27 Thus, the Evidence
Code permits evidence of misconduct by trial jurors to be received but
forbids the receipt of evidence about the effect of such misconduct on
the deliberations of the jurors.28 Examples of permissible evidence in-
clude improper discussion by jurors of the accused's failure to testify,
as well as of the sentence the court might impose if they found the
accused guilty.29 Evidence may also be received to show that, while
sitting as a juror, the juror read, watched, heard, or discussed news
accounts about the case in which he was sitting, or asked witnesses
questions about any matter related to the case.30
The Federal Rules take a more restrictive approach. In addition
to precluding ajuror from testifying about "anything upon that or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's
mental processes in connection therewith," the Federal Rules also
provide that a juror may not testify about "any matter or statement
26. Id. § 1150.
27. Id. Other goals include preserving the stability of verdicts, discouraging post-ver-
dict jury tampering, and protecting the privacy of jury deliberations. In re Hamilton, 975
P.2d 600, 613 n.18 (Cal. 1999).
28. CAL. EvD. CODE § 1150 cmt.
29. People v. Hord, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 63 (Ct. App. 1993).
30. See Province (Cassandra) v. Ctr. for Women's Health, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667, 670-71
(Ct. App. 1993) (and cases cited therein). It is not necessary for the complaining party to
show that the jurors discussed the news accounts. It is misconduct for jurors just to watch,
hear, or read such accounts. Id. See also City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 30-31 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding that the denial of motion for mistrial and request
for replacement ofjuror after it appeared that there had been conversation between juror
and witness was not abuse of discretion).
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occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations. ' '3 1 A juror,
however, may testify "on the question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror."32
Tanner v. United States33 illustrates the differences between the Ev-
idence Code and the Federal Rules. Tanner appealed his convictions
for fraud on the ground that, after the verdict, the judge erroneously
denied him the opportunity to call two jurors who would testify that
some of their fellow jurors had ingested alcohol, marihuana, and co-
caine during the trial. 34 The United States Supreme Court upheld the
judge's denial of a hearing on the alleged juror misconduct. 35 Under
the Federal Rules as construed by the Court, "U] uror intoxication is
not an 'outside influence' about which jurors may testify to impeach
their verdicts."36
Section 1150 of the Evidence Code would not have barred the
jurors' testimony. Evidence of juror intoxication within or without the
jury room may be received if it is likely to have influenced the verdict
improperly.3 7 To protect the jurors, however, the Evidence Code
would have prohibited the accused from asking the jurors about the
effect that the intoxication had on their deliberations. The Evidence
Code affords the parties a broader basis for attacking a verdict on the
basis of juror misconduct while still protecting juror deliberations,
and should therefore be retained.
5. Hypnotized Witnesses
In People v. Shirley,38 the California Supreme Court held that "the
testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis for the purpose of
restoring his memory of the events in issue is inadmissible as to all
matters relating to those events, from the time of the hypnotic session
forward."39 The court was not convinced that the use of hypnosis to
restore the memory of a potential witness had been generally ac-
31. FED. R. EVTD. 606(b).
32. Id.
33. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 124-25.
36. Id. at 125.
37. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1150 (West 1995).
38. 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982).
39. Id. at 1384.
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cepted as a reliable technique by the relevant scientific community. 40
On the contrary, the court was troubled that
[d]uring the hypnotic session, neither the subject nor the hypno-
tist [could] distinguish between true memories and pseudomemo-
ries . . . and when the subject [repeated the] recall in the waking
state (e.g., in a trial), neither an expert nor a lay observer (e.g., the
judge or jury) [could] make a similar distinction. 41
The court was equally concerned with the ineffectiveness of cross-ex-
amination in exposing pseudomemories. Since a witness who has un-
dergone hypnosis sincerely believes that his testimony on the stand is
his true recollection and not the product of deliberate or inadvertent
suggestion during the hypnotic session, even the most vigorous cross-
examination cannot expose pseudomemories. 42
The court explicitly exempted a criminal defendant who had sub-
mitted to hypnosis from the disqualification announced in Shirley be-
cause of concerns about a defendant's right to testify in his own
defense. 43 Such an exemption for criminal defendants is consistent
with federal constitutional law. In Rock v. Arkansas,44 the United States
Supreme Court invalidated a state evidentiary rule that precluded the
use of a defendant's hypnotically refreshed' testimony. 45 Such a blan-
ket prohibition was held to violate the accused's right to present evi-
dence in his own defense.4 6
Shortly after the Shirley decision was announced, the California
electorate approved Proposition 8, the Victims Bill of Rights, which
amended the California Constitution. 47 One of its provisions, the
Right to Truth-in-Evidence, gives parties to criminal proceedings the
state constitutional right not to have relevant evidence excluded.48
40. Id. at 1383.
41. Id. at 1382.
42. Id. at 1383.
43. Id. at 1384.
44. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
45. Id. at 62.
46. Id. The accused's right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, however.
Even under Rock, a judge may exclude a defendant's posthypnotic testimony if the state
can demonstrate its unreliability in the case at hand. Id.
47. For a discussion of the effect of Proposition 8 on the rules of evidence that apply
in criminal cases, see MIGUEL MtNDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE FEDERAL
RULES-A PROBLEM APPROACH § 3.07 (2d ed. 1999).
48. Section 28(d) the California Constitution states:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the mem-
bership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded
in any criminal proceeding.... Nothing in this section shall affect any existing
statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code Sec-
tions 352, 782, or 1103.
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Since barring the testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses may
exclude relevant evidence, a literal application of Proposition 8 would
overturn Shirley. Concerned that the proposition would permit previ-
ously hypnotized witnesses to testify in all criminal cases, the Califor-
nia Legislature added section 795 to the Evidence Code in 1984.
4 9
This section strikes a middle ground between Proposition 8 and the
disqualification announced in Shirley by permitting a previously hyp-
notized witness to testify if the judge finds that strict guidelines have
been followed. These guidelines are designed to prevent the hypnotic
session from improperly contaminating the witness's recall.
50
Section 795 clarifies Shirley by permitting previously hypnotized
witnesses to testify if their testimony is limited to those matters that
they recalled and related prior to the hypnotic session, so long as the
other conditions of the section are satisfied. The witnesses, however,
may not testify about new matters that surfaced during the hypnotic
session.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
49. CAL. EVID. CODE § 795 (West 2004) (legislative history). The Right to Truth-in-
Evidence provision can be amended by a super majority in each house of the Legislature.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). Section 795 complies with the super majority requirement. 2
CAL. LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, A.B. 2669, at 1656 (1983-84).
50. As amended, section 795(a) permits the use of a previously hypnotized witness's
testimony if the following conditions are met:
(1) The testimony is limited to those matters which the witness recalled and re-
lated prior to the hypnosis.
(2) The substance of the prehypnotic memory was preserved in written, audi-
otape, or video tape form prior to the hypnosis.
(3) The hypnosis was conducted in accordance with all of the following pro-
cedures:
(A) A written record was made prior to hypnosis documenting the subject's
description of the event, and information which was provided to the hypnotist
concerning the subject matter of the hypnosis.
(B) The subject gave informed consent to the hypnosis.
(C) The hypnosis session, including the pre-and post-hypnosis interviews,
was video tape recorded for subsequent review.
(D) The hypnosis was performed by a licensed medical doctor, psychologist,
or licensed clinical social worker, or a licensed marriage and family therapist ex-
perienced in the use of hypnosis and independent of and not in the presence of
law enforcement, the prosecution, or the defense.
(4) Prior to admission of the testimony, the court holds a hearing pursuant to
Section 402 of the Evidence Code at which the proponent of the evidence proves
by clear and convincing evidence that the hypnosis did not so affect the witness as
to render the witness' prehypnosis recollection unreliable or to substantially im-
pair the ability to cross-examine the witness concerning the witness' prehypnosis
recollection. At the hearing, each side shall have the right to present expert testi-
mony and to cross-examine witnesses.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 795(a).
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Unlike Shirley, section 795 does not expressly exempt the criminal
defendant from its application. People v. Aguilar,51 however, holds that
Shirley, not section 795, governs the use of a criminal defendant's post-
hypnotic testimony.52 Since Shirley places no restrictions on the use of
such testimony, the fact that the accused was hypnotized under cir-
cumstances that violate the conditions of section 795 is not a ground
for preventing the accused from testifying.53
Section 795 applies only to criminal proceedings. But since Shirley
does not distinguish between criminal and civil proceedings, Shirley
governs the use of a witness's post-hypnotic testimony in civil proceed-
ings. Accordingly, if a witness in a civil matter has been hypnotized for
the purpose of restoring her memory of the events in issue, the wit-
ness's testimony is inadmissible as to all matters relating to those
events from the hypnotic session forward. 54 Shirley, however, does not
apply to pre-hypnotic evidence offered in a civil case. Thus, a civil "wit-
ness who has undergone hypnosis is not barred from testifying to
events which the court finds were recalled and related prior to the
hypnotic session." 55 However, because Shirley exempts only the ac-
cused from the testimonial disqualification, Shirley applies to all the
parties in a civil proceeding. 56 Accordingly, a party in a civil case is
barred from testifying if the party's recollection of the events in ques-
tion first surfaced during the hypnotic session.
The Federal Rules do not contain a provision equivalent to sec-
tion 795. Because section 795 preserves the holding of the most im-
portant California decision on the admissibility of previously
hypnotized witnesses' testimony, the section should be retained.
51. 267 Cal. Rptr. 879 (Ct. App. 1990).
52. Id. at 883.
53. Applying section 795 to criminal defendants would not necessarily violate their
right to present evidence in their own defense. In Rock v. Arkansas, the United States Su-
preme Court held that a state can bar an accused's posthypnotic testimony if the state can
demonstrate its unreliability in a given case. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
Since section 795 is designed to prevent the hypnotic session from improperly contaminat-
ing the witness's recall, using the section to exclude a defendant's post-hypnotic testimony
may not be unconstitutional.
54. People v. Shirley, 753 P.2d 1354, 1384 (Cal. 1982).
55. People v. Hayes, 783 P.2d 719, 725 (Cal. 1989). Section 795 supersedes the Shirley-
Hayes rule only in criminal cases. See Schall v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d 191, 195 (Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly, a witness in a civil case is barred from testifying if
the witness's recollection of the events in question first surfaced during the hypnotic
session.
56. See Schall 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 196.
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H. Witness Credibility
A. Credibility in General
Trial lawyers know that the outcome of a trial will be determined
in almost all cases by the witnesses the jurors choose to believe and the
ones they decide to ignore. Telling jurors which witnesses to believe
or disbelieve is thus a crucial part of a closing argument. But such an
appeal will not be persuasive unless the lawyer can give the jurors rea-
sons rooted in the evidence about why a witness should be believed or
disbelieved. This inescapable dynamic ofjury trials encourages lawyers
to produce the most favorable evidence about the credibility of their
witnesses and the most unfavorable about their opponents. Rules of
evidence generally counter this inclination by placing strict limits on
the use of evidence to support or attack the credibility of witnesses.
Despite the unquestioned relevance of such evidence, the rules pro-
ceed on the assumption that the unrestrained use of evidence on wit-
ness credibility may distract and confuse jurors about the substantive
issues to be decided.
The rules restrict the use of evidence on witness credibility in two
ways. First, the rules limit the kind of evidence that can be used to
support or attack the credibility of witnesses. Second, the rules some-
times limit the circumstances when such evidence may be used. For
example, evidence that a witness has made statements consistent with
his testimony on direct examination is generally inadmissible to sup-
port the witness unless the opposing party has first attacked the wit-
ness's credibility. 57
A unique feature of the Evidence Code is section 780. This sec-
tion provides a nonexclusive list of the matters that the finder of fact
can consider in assessing the credibility of witnesses. The list is techni-
cally unnecessary. Evidence bearing on credibility is relevant, and, un-
less otherwise provided, all relevant evidence is admissible.58 The list is
nonetheless invaluable because it enables California judges and law-
yers to grasp easily the broad spectrum of evidence that may be availa-
ble to attack or support a witness's credibility. Section 780 provides as
follows:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, the court or jury may con-
sider in determining the credibility of a witness any matter that has
any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his
57. FED. R. EV/D. 801 (d)(1)(B); CAL. EViD. CODE § 791(a) (West 1995).
58. CAL. EVID. CODE § 351.
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testimony at the hearing, including but not limited to any of the
following:
(a) His demeanor while testifying and the manner in which
he testifies.
(b) The character of his testimony.
(c) The extent of his capacity to perceive, to recollect, or to
communicate any matter about which he testifies.
(d) The extent of his opportunity to perceive any matter
about which he testifies.
(e) His character for honesty or veracity or their opposites.
(f) The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other
motive.
(g) A statement previously made by him that is consistent with
his testimony at the hearing.
(h) A statement made by him that is inconsistent with any
part of his testimony at the hearing.
(i) The existence or nonexistence of any fact testified to by
him.
(j) His attitude toward the action in which he testifies or to-
ward the giving of testimony.
(k) His admission of untruthfulness. 59
The Federal Rules do not contain an equivalent provision, but
similar principles may be derived by applying Rule 401, which defines
relevant evidence to include evidence that is probative of a witness's
credibility,60 and Rule 402, which declares that all relevant evidence is
admissible unless otherwise excluded. 6 1 Because of the usefulness of
section 780 to judges and lawyers, it should be retained.
B. Proposition 8
In June 1982, the California electorate approved Proposition 8,
an initiative entitled the Victims Bill of Rights. One of its provisions,
the Right to Truth-in-Evidence, transformed the rules of evidence ap-
plicable to criminal proceedings by amending the state constitution to
give the parties a right not to have relevant evidence excluded.6 2 This
provision, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote
of the membership of each house of the Legislature, relevant evi-
dence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding .... Noth-
ing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence
relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code Sections 352,
782, or 1103.63
59. Id. § 780.
60. FED. R. EVID. 401.
61. FED. R. EVID. 402.
62. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
63. Id.
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A literal application of the Truth-in-Evidence provision would re-
peal all the Evidence Code sections that ban or limit evidence bearing
on the credibility of witnesses. 64 Since such evidence is relevant, its
admissibility would be governed instead by section 352, a section ex-
pressly exempted from the operation of the Right to Truth-in-Evi-
dence provision. Under section 352, a California judge may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
enumerated trial concerns. 65 These include the risk that the evidence
may consume too much time, unfairly prejudice the opposing party,
confuse the issues, or mislead the jury.66 A literal interpretation of the
proposition would thus replace the certainty provided by specific rules
governing credibility with the discretion accorded trial judges by sec-
tion 352.
The effect of Proposition 8 is to create two systems of rules for
governing evidence offered on witness credibility in California. The
Evidence Code continues in effect in civil cases, but Proposition 8 now
governs in criminal proceedings. 67
The Federal Rules, in contrast, do not contain a provision
equivalent to Proposition 8. The Federal Rules continue the tradition
of having one set of evidentiary rules apply generally to all trials irre-
spective of whether the proceeding is civil or criminal.
C. Statutory Provisions
1. Sexual Assault Victims-Criminal Cases
California's rape shield provisions affect defense evidence in two
ways. First, section 1103(c) prohibits the use of evidence of the vic-
64. Section 782, however, would not be affected because it is expressly exempted from
the operation of Proposition 8. CAL. EVID. CODE § 782. Section 782 governs the use of a
complaining witness's sexual conduct to attack her credibility in sex offense prosecutions.
Id.
65. Id. § 352.
66. Id.
67. Proposition 8 permits amendments to the initiative if approved by at least a two-
thirds vote of each house. In People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1994), the California
Supreme Court held that whatever repealing effects Proposition 8 had on California Evi-
dence Code section 1101 (a) had been superseded by an amendment that had the effect of
reenacting the entire section by the required super majority. Id. at 763. Section 1101 (a)
bans the use of evidence to prove conduct in conformity with a person's character. CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1101 (a). The reenactment of section 1101, however, leaves untouched the
effects of the initiative on the code sections governing the use of character evidence to
attack or support the credibility of witnesses. Section 1101 (c) provides that "[n]othing in
this section affects the admissibility of evidence offered to support or attack the credibility
of a witness." Id. § 1101(c).
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tim's sexual relations with others to prove that the victim consented to
having sexual relations with the accused because she is the kind of
person who engages in consensual sex. 68 The defense is limited to
proving only the victim's sexual conduct with the accused. 69 Second,
section 782 prohibits the use of evidence of the complaining witness's
sexual conduct offered under section 780 to attack her credibility, un-
less at a separate hearing the judge concludes that the probative value
of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the concerns enu-
merated in section 352.70 Section 352 gives California judges the dis-
cretion to exclude relevant evidence whenever its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the dangers that it will consume too much
time, confuse the issues, mislead the jurors, or create undue
prejudice. 7 1 Section 780 allows the finder of fact to consider in deter-
mining the credibility of a witness any evidence that "has any tendency
in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of [the witness's]
testimony. "72
The term "sexual conduct ... encompasses any behavior that re-
flects the actor's or speaker's willingness to engage in sexual activ-
ity."' 7 3 Section 782 sets out an elaborate procedure, including the
filing by the accused of a written motion and offer of proof, to be
followed in screening evidence offered under Section 782.74 Failure to
comply with the procedural requirements will preclude the accused
from raising the trial judge's error in excluding evidence of the com-
plaining witness's sexual conduct that is offered to attack her
credibility. 75
To obtain a hearing on the admissibility of the impeaching evi-
dence, the accused must persuade the judge that the proposed evi-
dence is "sufficient." 76 Presumably, the proffer is sufficient if it is
probative of a proposition discrediting the complaining witness's cred-
68. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1103(c). For an extended discussion of this provision, see Mi-
GUEL A. MENDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE FEDERAL RULES-A PROBLEM
APPROACH § 3.12 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter M9NDEZ, THIRD EDITION].
69. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(c)(3).
70. Id. § 782. For an extended discussion of a judge's power to exclude relevant evi-
dence under section 352, see MtNDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra note 68, § 2.10.
71. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352.
72. Id. § 780.
73. People v. Franklin, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 380 (Ct. App. 1994).
74. Id. at 379-80.
75. People v. Sims, 134 Cal. Rptr. 566, 572 (Ct. App. 1976) (holding the accused's
failure to comply with the statutory requirements precluded his raising as error the trial
judge's exclusion of evidence that the complaining witness was pregnant at the time of the
alleged rape in order to prove that she had a motive to concoct the rape).
76. CAL. Evin. CODE § 782(a) (3).
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ibility and the use of the proffered evidence for that purpose is not
barred by the Evidence Code. Yet even if the evidence produced at the
hearing is probative of the victim's lack of credibility and its use is not
barred by the Evidence Code, the judge may still exclude the evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the concerns enu-
merated in section 352. In sex offense prosecutions, the trial judge's
discretion to exclude evidence impeaching the complaining witness
has been upheld as constitutional. 77
The Federal Rules also contain a rape shield provision. Rule 412
allows the accused to offer evidence of specific instances of his own
sexual conduct with the victim to prove consent, if the judge first de-
termines at a separate hearing that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudice to the victim. 78 Rule 412 also allows the ac-
cused to offer evidence of specific instances of the victim's specific
sexual conduct with others to prove that someone other than the ac-
cused is responsible for the assault charged. 79 The use of the evidence
for this purpose is also subject to a finding at a separate hearing that
its probative value outweighs its prejudice to the victim.80 Unlike the
Evidence Code, however, Rule 412 does not authorize the use of evi-
dence of the victim's sexual conduct for impeachment purposes.8'
California was among the first jurisdictions to enact a provision
governing the use of the victim's sexual conduct to attack her credibil-
ity. When the Legislature enacted section 782 thirty years ago, it opted
to give judges the power to screen the evidence for undue prejudice
instead of banning the evidence outright. The flexible response pro-
vided by section 782 seems to have served California well and should
be retained.
77. People v. Blackburn, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1976).
78. FED. R. EVWD. 412 and advisory committee's note.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Rule 412, as enacted, barred the use of the evidence for this purpose by failing to
authorize its use. The rule proceeded from the assumption that evidence of the victim's
predisposition to engage in sex acts was inadmissible in a criminal case for any purpose
unless otherwise authorized by the rule. See FED. R. EVD. 412 advisory committee's note
(regarding the 1994 amendment); JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE: RULES, STATUTE
AND CASE SUPPLEMENT 47 (1993) (citing standing committee's note).
As part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Congress
amended Rule 412 to authorize in a civil case the use of the victim's sexual behavior in
certain circumstances. The amended rule, however, continues to bar evidence "relating to
the alleged victim's sexual behavior or alleged sexual predisposition, whether offered as
substantive evidence or impeachment," unless otherwise authorized. FED. R. EvID. 412 advi-
sory committee's note (emphasis added). No express authorization of the use of the evi-
dence for impeachment is contained in the amended rule.
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2. Sexual Assault Victims-Civil Cases
The same concerns that prompted the Legislature to enact the
rape shield laws moved it to pass legislation protecting plaintiffs in
sexual harassment, battery, and assault lawsuits.8 2 Evidence Code sec-
tion 1106 prohibits the defendant in such actions from offering evi-
dence of the plaintiffs sexual conduct with others to prove consent or
the absence of injury, unless the plaintiff claims loss of consortium.83
As in the case of the rape shield laws, however, the prohibition does
not apply to evidence of the plaintiffs sexual conduct with the alleged
perpetrator. 84 Moreover, if the plaintiff introduces evidence making
her own sexual conduct an issue, the defendant is entitled to offer
rebuttal evidence.8 5
Section 783, not 1106, governs the use of a plaintiffs sexual con-
duct as evidence to attack the credibility of a plaintiff in a sexual har-
assment, battery, or assault lawsuit. Section 783 affords plaintiffs in
civil actions the same protections afforded by section 782 to victims in
prosecutions for sexual assault. Before a defendant may offer evidence
of the plaintiffs sexual conduct to attack her credibility, the defen-
dant must file a motion accompanied by an offer of proof setting forth
the evidence the defendant wishes to introduce. 8 6 If the judge finds
the offer "sufficient," the judge must hold a hearing outside the pres-
ence of the jury to allow the defendant to question the plaintiff.87 At
the conclusion of the hearing, the judge may either exclude the evi-
dence or admit it subject to whatever limitations the judge imposes
under section 352.88
Federal Rule 412, the federal rape shield provision, also applies
in civil cases involving sexual misconduct, such as sexual harassment
claims.8 9 Rather than describe the limited purposes for which evi-
dence of a victim's sexual behavior or predisposition may be received
in civil cases, Rule 412 commits the admissibility of the evidence to the
court's discretion. If the evidence is otherwise admissible under the
Federal Rules, it may be received if the court finds that its probative
value on contested issues substantially outweighs the danger of harm
82. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2036.1 (West 2004) (legislative history); CAL. Ev"D.
CODE § 783 (West 1995) (legislative history).
83. CAL. EvIo. CODE § 1106(a).
84. Id. § 1106(b).
85. Id. § 1106(c).
86. Id. §§ 783(a)-(b).
87. Id. § 783(c).
88. Id. § 738(d).
89. FED. R. EVID. 412 and advisory committee's note.
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to the victim and of prejudice to any party.90 But, as has been noted,
Rule 412, unlike the Evidence Code, does not authorize the use of
evidence of the plaintiffs sexual conduct for impeachment
purposes.9 1
Section 783, like section 782, affordsjudges the necessary flexibil-
ity in determining whether to let in evidence of a victim's sexual con-
duct, and should therefore also be retained.
3. Impeachment by Character of the Witness-Prior Bad Acts
The common law allowed the cross-examiner to impeach a wit-
ness by inquiring into acts of misconduct by the witness that were not
the subject of a conviction. 92 An example would be asking the witness
if he cheated on his latest income tax returns. The theory of impeach-
ment is that jurors ought to question the veracity of witnesses who
engage in "bad acts." The bad acts doctrine is based on a character
theory of impeachment. The misdeeds are offered as evidence of the
witness's predisposition to lie under oath.
The Evidence Code rejects the prior bad acts doctrine. 93 Section
787 prohibits the use of specific instances of a witness's conduct to
prove a character trait to attack (or support) the credibility of the
witness.9 4 In civil proceedings, section 787's ban on the use of prior
bad acts continues in effect.
In criminal cases, however, Proposition 8 repeals section 787.
9 5
The Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision gives parties to criminal pro-
ceedings the state constitutional right not to have relevant evidence
90. Id. Before admitting evidence under Rule 412, the judge, upon motion by the
offering party, must hold an in camera hearing at which the alleged victim and all parties
are entitled to be heard. The motion must be filed at least fourteen days before the trial,
unless the judge for good cause requires a different time or permits filing during trial. Id.
91. FED. R. Evro. 412 advisory committee's note; WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 81, at
46.
92. CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EviDENCE § 42 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ET AL., SEC-
OND EDITION].
93. Even before the Evidence Code was adopted, California did not recognize the
prior bad acts doctrine. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2051 (repealed 1967) (excluding evidence of
particular acts).
94. CAL. EVID. CODE § 787 (West 1995).
95. People v. Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 639-41 (Cal. 1989); People v. Adams, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 580, 584 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that under Proposition 8 the accused was entitled
to offer evidence that the complaining witness in a rape case had falsely accused others of
rape).
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excluded. 96 Evidence that a witness has cheated on his income tax
returns is probative of the witness's character for lack of veracity. The
proposition that the witness is the kind of person who will not tell the
truth under oath is rendered more likely by evidence that he lies on
his income tax returns than the proposition would be without the evi-
dence.97 Accordingly, under Proposition 8 such evidence is admissible
in criminal cases unless excluded by the judge under section 352.98
The Federal Rules introduced the prior bad acts doctrine into
federal practice for the first time.99 The Federal Rules permit the
cross-examiner to inquire into specific instances of misconduct by the
witness that may be probative of the witness's bad character for truth-
fulness. 100 But to limit the doctrine, the Federal Rules preserve the
common law restriction binding the examiner to the witness's an-
swer. 101 If the witness denies committing the act, the examiner is pro-
hibited from proving it extrinsically. 10 2 Moreover, federal judges have
the discretionary power to prevent the examiner from inquiring into
prior bad acts if their probative value regarding the witness's lack of
veracity is outweighed by the concerns enumerated in Federal Rule
403.103 This rule, which is the federal equivalent of Evidence Code
section 352, allows a judge to take into account the prejudicial effects
of the evidence. Unfair prejudice is likely to be highest when the
cross-examiner seeks to impeach a criminal defendant with an act of
misconduct that is identical or similar to the charges against which the
accused is defending. 10 4
The Federal Rules permit a party to inquire into specific in-
stances of conduct that may be probative of the witness's good charac-
96. For an extended discussion of the impact of Proposition 8 on the limitations on
evidence bearing on credibility, see MENDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra note 68, § 15.03.
97. For an extended is discussion of the meaning of relevance, see id. § 2.01.
98. See People v. Hill, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 45 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the ac-
cused was entitled to impeach a prosecution witness by evidence that the witness
threatened to kill a woman who had reported a criminal incident involving the witness's
boyfriend to the police). For an extended discussion of the judge's discretion to exclude
evidence that is admissible under Proposition 8, see MENDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra note 68,
§ 2.11.
99. See Lester B. Orfield, Impeachment and Support of Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases,
11 U. KAN. L. REv. 447, 460-64 (1964) (explaining that prior to the enactment of the
Federal Rules, federal courts barred the use of prior bad acts to impeach witnesses).
100. FED R. EVD. 608(b).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at advisory committee's note.
104. Id.
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ter for truthfulness. 10 5 The rule is oddly worded in that it limits such
inquiry to the cross-examination of the witness. 10 6 Since it is unlikely
that a cross-examiner will seek to support the credibility of the witness,
the framers may have had redirect, rather than cross-examination, in
mind.107
California's antipathy to the prior bad acts doctrine is longstand-
ing. Section 787 of the Evidence Code is based on former section 2051
of the Code of Civil Procedure.10 8 California cases citing section 2051
to disapprove the use of the prior bad acts doctrine date back over
one hundred years. 10 9 Dean Charles McCormick opposed the doc-
trine "because of the dangers otherwise of prejudice (particularly if
the witness is a party), of distraction and confusion, of abuse by the
asking of unfounded questions, and of the difficulties, as demon-
strated in the cases of appeal, of ascertaining whether particular acts
relate to character for [lack of] truthfulness."' 10 California's ap-
proach, as embodied in section 787, should thus be retained.
4. Impeachment by Character of the Witness-Convictions
California Civil Cases. Evidence Code section 788 embodies the
common law rule that a witness's credibility may be attacked by evi-
dence that the witness has been convicted of a felony.11 The reason
witnesses who have been convicted of crimes should not be trusted to
testify truthfully is not altogether clear. At common law, convicts were
disqualified from testifying. 112 When the disqualification was re-
moved, convicts could testify, but at a price: their convictions could be
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Virgin Islands v. Roldan, 612 F.2d 775, 778 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that the
party calling the witness may rehabilitate on redirect where the bad character evidence first
surfaced on cross-examination).
108. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 787 cmt. (West 1995).
109. See, e.g., Sharon v. Sharon, 22 P. 26, 38 (Cal. 1889).
110. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) (footnotes
omitted).
111. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788. Where the witness to be impeached is the accused, it is
immaterial that the conviction offered occurred after the conduct for which the accused is
on trial. Since the issue is the accused's veracity as a witness, what matters is that the convic-
tion occur prior to the time the accused takes the stand. People v. Halsey, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d
701, 702 (Ct. App. 1993). A qualifying conviction may be used to impeach even if the
sentence has not been imposed at the time the conviction is offered. See People v. Marti-
nez, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 359 (Ct. App. 1998).
112. Persons convicted of any felony or misdemeanors involving dishonesty or obstruc-
tion of justice were incompetent to testify. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42 (John W.
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
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used to impeach them. Section 788 follows this tradition by allowing a
party to impeach a witness by evidence that the witness has been con-
victed of a felony.113
Both the Evidence Code and the Federal Rules justify the use of
convictions to impeach witnesses based on a character theory of rele-
vance. 114 They allow the finders of fact to consider the misconduct
underlying the conviction as evidence of a flaw in the witness's charac-
ter for truth-telling under oath. So viewed, convictions may be proba-
tive of a witness's character for lack of veracity in two circumstances.
The first is where the witness committed a crime involving dishonesty
or false statement. Most legal commentators would agree that convic-
tions based on deceitful misconduct might say something about the
witness's predisposition to lie under oath. 115 Although less plausible,
the second circumstance is where the witness committed some other
type of crime and the witness was aware that his conduct (1) violated
the penal laws or (2) subjected others to harms the penal laws seek to
avoid.11 6 Where the witness was unaware that he was breaking the law
or exposing others to criminal harms, a conviction for his misconduct
would say nothing about his propensity to disregard his legal obliga-
tion to testify truthfully. Accordingly, in the absence of evidence that
the witness was aware that he was violating the penal laws or subjecting
others to the harms proscribed by the penal laws, convictions for neg-
ligence or strict liability offenses should be inadmissible to impeach.
Only those who consciously break the penal laws may be inclined to
disregard their legal obligation to tell the truth under oath. Likewise,
only those who consciously subject others to criminal harms may be
said to be inclined to injure others by lying under oath. The Evidence
Code, however, does not distinguish between convictions predicated
on negligence or strict liability and convictions based on a higher
113. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788.
114. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note; CAL. EvID. CODE § 788 cmt.
115. See, e.g., C. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 6.29 (2d ed. 1999). Social scien-
tists, however, disagree about the value of past misconduct in predicting future miscon-
duct. The belief that "character traits" exert influence over time and across diverse
situations has been challenged by some experimental psychologists, most notably Walter
Mischel. See WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 121-22 (John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. ed., 1968); MtNDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra note 68, § 3.09. Some legal scholars also
question the predictive value of past misconduct. When Congress amended the Federal
Rules of Evidence to include provisions allowing evidence of the accused's other sexual
assaults as proof of the accused's propensity to commit the sexual assault charged, of the
more than forty judges, practicing lawyers, and academics asked to review the amend-
ments, only the representatives of the U.S. Department of Justice favored adopting the
amendments. See id. § 3.14.
116. See MfNDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra note 68, § 15.07.
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mens rea, such as recklessness, knowledge, or purpose. Section 788
permits impeachment by any felony conviction.11 7
The flaw in the Evidence Code's structure becomes more appar-
ent when another consideration is taken into account. The impeach-
ing party is not allowed to explore the details of the misconduct giving
rise to the conviction." 8 The jurors are to infer from the conviction
that the witness engaged in misconduct that is probative of his charac-
ter for lack of veracity. How jurors can do this when the witness has
been convicted of felonies based on strict liability or negligence is dif-
ficult to fathom.
These difficulties could have been mitigated if the California Leg-
islature had adopted the recommendation of Professor James H.
Chadbourne who, at the request of the California Law Revision Com-
mission, prepared the study that eventually gave rise to the Evidence
Code.' 19 Professor Chadbourne recommended a rule that would have
limited convictions offered to impeach a witness to those in which an
essential element of the crime is dishonesty or false statement. 120 Per-
jury would be an example of a crime involving both a false statement
and dishonesty. A violation requires proof that a person knowingly
stated as true a material matter that the person knew to be false. 121
Jurors would have few problems using a conviction for this crime as
proof of the witness's predisposition to lie under oath. But in enacting
section 788 the Legislature rejected Professor Chadbourne's recom-
mendation and instead retained the approach formerly contained in
the Code of Civil Procedure. That approach allows a witness to be
impeached by any felony conviction. 122
Section 788, however, does not strip California trial judges of dis-
cretion to exclude felony convictions when offered to impeach a wit-
ness. Because section 788 merely states that a party "may" show that
the witness has been convicted of a felony, 123 the use of the permissive
term has enabled the California appellate courts in civil cases (and in
criminal cases until the enactment of Proposition 8) to develop rules
117. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788.
118. People v. Terry, 113 Cal. Rptr. 233, 242 (Ct. App. 1974).
119. 6 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELAT-
ING TO THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 715-17 (Sept. 1964).
120. Id. at 715 (witness testimony).
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 118 (West 1999).
122. 6 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note 119, at 716.
123. CAL EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1995).
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disfavoring the use of convictions that say little or nothing about a
witness's character for lack of veracity. 124
Section 788 prohibits the use of felony convictions in four cir-
cumstances. A felony conviction may not be used to impeach a witness
where (1) a pardon based on the witness's innocence has been
granted by the jurisdiction in which the witness was convicted, (2) a
pardon has been granted on the basis of a certificate of rehabilitation,
(3) the conviction has been set aside because the felon has fulfilled
the conditions of probation, or (4) the witness has been convicted by
another jurisdiction and the witness has been relieved of the penalties
and disabilities arising from the conviction pursuant to procedures
substantially equivalent to those described in (2) and (3).125
If a conviction offered under section 788 qualifies for use, the
impeaching party may prove it in one of two ways: by asking the wit-
ness to admit the conviction or by offering the record of the judgment
of conviction. 126 If the impeaching party uses the record, the party
must satisfy the requirements of authentication127 and the Secondary
Evidence Rule. a28 The party may, however, ignore the requirements of
either the business or official records exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Section 788 itself creates a hearsay exception for the record and allows
the record to be used as proof that the witness engaged in the con-
duct giving rise to the conviction.1 29
If the impeaching party seeks to prove the conviction through the
witness, two limitations apply. First, the impeaching party may not ask
about the conviction unless the party believes in good faith that the
witness has been convicted of a felony.130 Good faith may be demon-
124. For extended discussion of how the California appellate courts have limited the
use of felony convictions to impeach witnesses, see MENDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra note 68,
§ 15.07.
125. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788. A felony conviction does not need to be "final" to be used
to impeach a witness. A verdict of guilty will suffice even if the sentence has not been
pronounced. People v. Martinez, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 359 (Ct. App. 1998). Moreover, the
fact that the sentencing judge is authorized to reduce a felony conviction to a misde-
meanor conviction at sentencing does not bar the use of the verdict to impeach until such
time as the sentencing judge actually reduces the conviction to a misdemeanor. See id.
126. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 cmt.
127. For a discussion of the requirements of authentication, see MkNDEZ, THIRD EDI-
TION, supra note 68, § 13.01.
128. For a discussion of the requirements of the Secondary Evidence Rule, see id.
§ 13.06.
129. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 cmt. Section 788 also creates a hearsay exception for the
witness's admission of the conviction as proof that the witness engaged in the conduct
giving rise to the conviction. Id.
130. People v. Perez, 373 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal. 1962).
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strated by possessing a copy of the judgment or other documentary
evidence of the conviction.13 1 Second, the impeaching party, as has
been noted, may not elicit the details that gave rise to the offense. 132
The impeaching party is limited to bringing out the nature of the
crime and date and place of the conviction. 133 The object is to im-
peach the witness, not to retry the case.
California Criminal Cases. Until the enactment of Proposition 8,
section 788 also governed the use of convictions to impeach witnesses
in criminal cases. Section 788 has been superseded by two seemingly
conflicting constitutional provisions enacted by Proposition 8 relating
to ajudge's discretionary power to exclude convictions. Section 28(f)
of Article I of the California Constitution strips judges of any such
discretion by requiring that felony convictions be used to impeach wit-
nesses "without limitation." 134 Section 28(d), on the other hand, reaf-
firms a judge's discretionary power to exclude relevant evidence
whenever its probative value is substantially outweighed by the con-
cerns enumerated in section 352.135 To reconcile the two provisions,
the California Supreme Court in People v. Castro136 interpreted Pro-
position 8 as restoring the kind of discretion judges had to exclude
convictions for undue prejudice prior to Proposition 8.137
Moved in part by the Fourteenth Amendment, the court also held
that due process requires the exclusion of felony convictions that do
not involve "moral turpitude."1 38 In the court's view, the use of such
convictions offends due process because such convictions say nothing
about the witness's character for lack of veracity.' 39 Therefore, to per-
mit the finder of fact to consider convictions devoid of moral turpi-
tude would deprive the accused of a fair trial in which the finder of
fact considers only relevant and competent evidence on the issue of
guilt or innocence. 140
Why does the court consider convictions involving moral turpi-
tude probative of a witness's lack of veracity? Because "a witness' [s]
moral depravity of any kind has some 'tendency in reason' . . . to
131. Id. at 622.
132. People v. Terry, 113 Cal. Rptr. 233, 242 (Ct. App. 1974).
133. Id.
134. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(f).
135. Id. § 28(d).
136. 696 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1985).
137. Id. at 117-18.
138. Id. at 119.
139. Id. at 117.
140. Id. at 118-19.
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shake one's confidence in his honesty."'14 Which felonies involve
moral turpitude? Clearly, felonies involving false statements-of
which perjury is the paradigm-since these felonies say something
about a witness's willingness to lie under oath. 4 2 But according to
Castro, any crime evincing a "readiness to do evil" involves moral turpi-
tude.143 Presumably, witnesses with such a character trait might do
mischief on the stand by disregarding their obligation to testify truth-
fully under oath. Not surprisingly, Castro has spawned its own exten-
sive jurisprudence regarding the identity of convictions involving
moral turpitude and the scope of a judge's discretion to exclude
convictions.144
Federal Cases. Under Federal Rule 609, a party may impeach any
witness in any case with any timely misdemeanor or felony conviction
involving dishonesty or false statement.' 45 It is immaterial whether the
case is civil or criminal or whether the witness to be impeached is the
accused or some other witness. The judge has no discretion to ex-
clude such convictions. 14 6
If the conviction does not involve dishonesty or a false statement,
then in the case of a witness other than the accused only felony con-
victions may be used to impeach if the judge finds that the probative
value of the conviction is not substantially outweighed by the concerns
enumerated in Federal Rule 403.147 Federal Rule 403 is the federal
equivalent of Evidence Code section 352 and includes unfair
prejudice and waste of time among the enumerated grounds.' 4 8 To be





144. For a discussion of these points, see MENDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra note 68,
§ 15.07.
145. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
146. Id. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609, as construed by the Ninth Circuit, convic-
tions involving dishonesty or false statement include only those crimes that involve deceit.
See United States v. Brackeen, 969 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (per curiam).
Shoplifting, burglary, grand theft, bank robbery, and receiving stolen property, while disre-
spectful of the property rights of others, do not involve deceit in the abstract. See United
States v. Foster, 227 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (and cases cited therein). However,
unlike California judges, Ninth Circuit judges may consider evidence regarding the cir-
cumstances attending the commission of the convicted offense to determine whether its
commission involved deceit. See id. at 1100 n.2.
147. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
148. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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If the conviction does not involve dishonesty or false statements,
then where the witness to be impeached is the accused, felony convic-
tions may be used only if the judge determines "that the probative
value of admitting [the conviction] outweighs its prejudicial effect to
the accused." 149 Because of the risk that a jury might misuse convic-
tions as evidence of the accused's guilt, the Federal Rules require the
government to show in all cases that the probative value of the convic-
tions, as impeachment evidence, outweighs their prejudicial effect to
the accused.1 5 0 Thus, this test, and not the test of Federal Rule 403, is
employed.
Under the Federal Rules, convictions may not be used to attack
the credibility of a witness:
[I]f a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of
the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confine-
ment imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, un-
less the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. How-
ever, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old . . . is not
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party suffi-
cient advance written notice of intent to use such [conviction] evi-
dence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
contest the use of such evidence. 15 1
In federal court, juvenile adjudications are generally inadmissible
to impeach witnesses. But the judge may
in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a
witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would
be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is
satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determi-
nation of the issue of guilt or innocence. 152
A conviction may not be used to impeach if:
(1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment,
certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based
on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that
person has not been convicted of a subsequent [felony grade]
crime ... , or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon,
annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of
innocence.153
149. FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(1).
150. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note.
151. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
152. FED. R. EVID. 609(d).
153. FED. R. EvID. 609(c).
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The pendency of an appeal from a conviction does not render evi-
dence of the conviction inadmissible, but evidence of the pendency of
an appeal is admissible. 154
Comparing the Evidence Code and the Federal Rules. The chief
difference between the Evidence Code and the Federal Rules is that
the Federal Rules recognize in part the special pertinence of convic-
tions involving dishonesty and false statement. Indeed, Federal Rule
609, as reported by the House Judiciary Committee, permitted an at-
tack upon the credibility of a witness by conviction only if the crime
involved dishonesty or false statement.155 The Committee
was of the view that, because of the danger of unfair prejudice in
[allowing the use of convictions without restriction as to type] and
the deterrent effect upon an accused who might wish to testify, and
even upon a witness who was not the accused, cross-examination by
evidence of prior conviction should be limited to those kinds of
convictions bearing directly on credibility, i.e., crimes involving dis-
honesty or false statement.1 56
This position accords with Professor Chadbourne's, who urged the
same limitation in the Evidence Code.1 57
The House position, however, did not prevail completely. Federal
Rule 609 instead reflects a compromise by the House/Senate Confer-
ence Committee. 158 The compromise retained the House position
that any witness may be impeached by any felony or misdemeanor
conviction involving dishonesty or false statement, but also incorpo-
rated the approach of a District of Columbia statute by allowing the
use of any felony conviction, subject to the judge's discretionary pow-
ers described in the rule. 159 As the Advisory Committee noted, the
compromise reflected disagreement about the probative value of con-
victions: "There is little dissent from the general proposition that at
least some crimes are relevant to credibility but much disagreement
among the cases and commentators about which crimes are usable for
this purpose. '1 60 Greater accord, however, might be reached if the
purpose of the conviction is kept in mind. The conviction is offered as
proof that the witness engaged in the misconduct giving rise to the
conviction. That misconduct in turn is offered as evidence of the wit-
ness's predisposition to lie under oath. Therefore, only those convic-
154. FED. R. EVID. 609(e).
155. FED. R. EVID. 609 note (HouseJudiciary Committee's report).
156. Id.
157. See 6 CAL. LAw REVISION COMM'N, supra note 119 and accompanying text.
158. See FED. R. EVID. 609 note (House/Senate Conference Committee's report).
159. Id. at advisory committee's note.
160. Id.
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dons most directly probative of this trait-those involving dishonesty
or false statement-should be used.
The point is reinforced by the California rule prohibiting the im-
peaching party from bringing out the details of the misconduct giving
rise to the conviction. 161 To avoid extended inquiry into matters relat-
ing to credibility, jurors are to infer from the conviction that the wit-
ness engaged in misconduct that is probative of his character for lack
of veracity. Jurors may discharge this function without much difficulty
when the conviction offered is for perjury, subornation of perjury,
false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, false pretenses, or
other crimen falsi offenses. But jurors are less likely to accurately as-
sess the probative value of other crimes on the witness's character for
lack of veracity. While crimes such as murder and assault may say
something about the offender's predisposition to commit assaultive
offenses, they say much less, if anything, about the offender's propen-
sity to lie under oath. The use of such crimes, moreover, invites jurors
to apply an inappropriate "bad" person standard in assessing a wit-
ness's credibility.
Rule 609 correctly notes that misdemeanors involving dishonesty
or false statement are as probative of a witness's character for lack of
veracity as are felonies for the same offenses. Rule 609, however, ig-
nores the need to give trial judges discretion in determining whether
to allow a party to use such a conviction. California's experience, both
before and after the enactment of Proposition 8, underscores the im-
portance of giving trial judges discretion.162 The convictions may be
remote, the witness having led a blameless life since the conviction, 163
and, unlike Rule 609, section 788 of the Evidence Code does not con-
tain a provision defining staleness in terms of years. Moreover, if the
witness to be impeached is a party, the conviction might be identical
or similar to the misconduct at issue at the trial. If so, the risk is in-
creased that the jurors might impermissibly use the conviction as bad
character evidence of a material element, as opposed to evidence of a
propensity to lie under oath.16 4 Finally, unless judges are given discre-
tion, where the witness has many convictions involving dishonesty or
false statement, the prejudice inherent in using numerous convictions
would be severe, especially where the witness to be impeached is a
161. People v. Terry, 113 Cal. Rptr. 233, 242 (Ct. App. 1974).
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party. 165 The temptation for the jurors to find against that person be-
cause he is a "bad" person might prove irresistible.
Conforming section 788 to Rule 609 is only a partial solution. 166
A more complete solution involves rewriting the first sentence of sec-
tion 788 as follows: "For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, it may be shown by the examination of the witness or by the
record of the judgment that he or she has been convicted of a felony
or misdemeanor involving dishonesty or false statement . . . ." The
comment could then be rewritten to provide examples of offenses in-
volving dishonesty and false statement. It should then be made ex-
plicit that the use of convictions to impeach a witness is subject to the
exercise of the judge's discretion embodied in section 352. In addi-
tion, the comment would list the most important considerations the
California courts have identified in weighing the probative value of
convictions against their prejudicial effects. Finally, in light of the
Commission's decision not to recommend any measures affecting the
changes made by Proposition 8, the comment should include a state-
ment that the amendment is intended to affect only civil cases.
5. Impeachment by Character of the Witness-Reputation and
Opinion Regarding Veracity
California Civil Cases. California Evidence Code sections 786-87
permit a party to impeach the credibility of a witness by opinion or
reputation evidence impugning the witness's character for honesty or
veracity.167 The same sections also permit a party to rehabilitate a wit-
ness by opinion or reputation evidence supporting the witness's char-
acter for honesty or veracity. 168 But evidence of the witness's good
character is inadmissible unless the witness's credibility has first been
attacked. 169 Additionally, the attack must take one of two forms-by
opinion or reputation evidence impugning the witness's character for
honesty or veracity170 or by a felony conviction. 17 1 Unless one of these
conditions is satisfied, the Evidence Code takes the position that evi-
165. Id.
166. Uniform Rule of Evidence 609 generally follows Federal Rule of Evidence 609. It
departs from the federal rule in substituting "untruthfulness" and "falsification" for "dis-
honesty" and "false statement." UNIF. RULES OF EVIDENCE 609, 13A U.L.A. 112 (1999). Uni-
form Rule of Evidence 609 provides: "Evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime
of untruthfulness or falsification is admissible, regardless of punishment, if the statutory
elements of the crime necessarily involve untruthfulness or falsification." Id.
167. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 786-87 (West 1995).
168. Id.
169. Id. § 790.
170. Id. § 786 law revision commission's cmt.
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dence of a witness's good character for honesty and veracity merely
introduces "collateral material that is unnecessary to a proper deter-
mination of any legitimate issue in the action."'172
California Criminal Cases. In criminal cases, a literal application
of Proposition 8 threatens to repeal the statutory and judicial re-
straints on the use of character evidence to attack and support the
credibility of witnesses. Under the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provi-
sion of the initiative, parties to criminal proceedings have a state con-
stitutional right not to have relevant evidence excluded, unless the
judge determines that the probative value of the evidence is substan-
tially outweighed by the costs of admitting it.173 A strict interpretation
of the proposition would have numerous significant effects.
First, it would repeal section 790, which prohibits the introduc-
tion of good character evidence until after the witness's character for
honesty and veracity has been attacked. A witness's credibility be-
comes an issue the moment the witness takes the stand. Therefore,
the calling party should be able to support the witness's credibility
even though it has not been attacked. Accordingly, People v. Taylor174
holds that a criminal defendant who takes the stand is entitled to offer
good character evidence of his honesty and veracity even if the prose-
cution has not first attacked the defendant's character as a witness.175
Second, in proving a witness's character for honesty or dishon-
esty, the proponent is no longer limited to reputation or opinion evi-
dence. Because specific instances of honesty or dishonesty are
probative of a witness's character for honesty or dishonesty, the spe-
cific acts are now admissible. People v. Harris,1 76 for example, holds
that the prosecution may prove an informant's predisposition to tes-
tify honestly at the trial by evidence of his past reliability as an inform-
ant.177 Likewise, People v. Adams' 78 holds that the accused in a rape
prosecution may prove the complaining witness's character for dis-
honesty as a witness by evidence that she had falsely accused others of
171. Convictions are admissible on the theory that they are probative of a witness's
character for lack of honesty and veracity. See id. § 788. Accordingly, their use permits a
witness to be rehabilitated by good character evidence for honesty and veracity in the form
of opinion or reputation evidence. Id. §§ 787, 790 & cmts.
172. Id. § 790 cmt.
173. For an extended discussion of this provision, see supra Part I1.B.
174. 225 Cal. Rptr. 733 (Ct. App. 1986).
175. Id. at 738.
176. 767 P.2d 619 (Cal. 1989).
177. Id. at 639-41.
178. 243 Cal. Rptr. 580 (Ct. App. 1988).
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rape. 179 Accordingly, Proposition 8 repeals section 787, which bans
the use of specific acts (other than convictions) to prove a witness's
character for veracity or lack of veracity.
The use of character evidence-whether in the form of opinion,
reputation, or specific acts-is still subject to discretionary exclusion
under section 352 even after Proposition 8.180 Ajudge may exclude all
or some of this evidence if its prejudicial effects substantially outweigh
its probative value on the witness's character for honesty or dishon-
esty. Where the witness who is impeached by the character evidence is
the accused, special concerns arise. A risk exists that the jury might
improperly convict the accused on account of his bad character rather
than upon the evidence of his guilt."" The risk is especially pro-
nounced when the prosecution seeks to impeach the accused with
specific acts of dishonesty that are similar to the offenses charged
against the accused.
Federal Cases. The Federal Rules track the common law with re-
spect to the use of character evidence to attack or support the credi-
bility of a witness. Federal Rule 608 (a) provides that a witness may be
attacked or supported by character evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation, provided the evidence refers only to "character for truth-
fulness or untruthfulness."18 2 Like the Evidence Code, however, the
Federal Rules prohibit the use of good character evidence unless the
witness's character for truthfulness has first "been attacked by opinion
or reputation evidence or otherwise. '183
"Otherwise" includes impeachment by conviction as well as by
prior bad acts, such as corruption, since in the Advisory Committee's
view these forms of impeachment impugn the witness's character for
truthfulness.1 84 Impeachment by bias or interest does not qualify as an
attack; yet whether impeachment by contradiction qualifies as an at-
tack on the character of the witness depends on the circumstances. 18 5
Where the contradicting evidence "amounts in net effect to an attack
on character for truth,"'8 6 a federal judge may permit the witness to
be rehabilitated through good character evidence for truthfulness.
179. Id. at 584.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
181. For an extended discussion of this point, see MPNDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra note
68, § 3.04.
182. FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (1).
183. FED. R. EviD. 608(a) (2).
184. Id. at advisory committee's note.
185. Id.
186. MCCORMICK ET AL., SECOND EDITION, supra note 92, § 49.
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In California civil cases, the Evidence Code prohibits the use of
prior bad acts to attack the credibility of a witness. Accordingly, Cali-
fornia should not adopt the "otherwise" provision of Federal Rule 608
unless the comment makes clear that the term does not embrace the
prior bad acts doctrine. Whether California should adopt the "other-
wise" provision to include impeachment by contradiction should de-
pend on whether the judge is empowered, as under Federal Rule 608,
to determine whether the impeaching evidence amounts to an attack
on the witness's character for lack of veracity. If in the judge's estimate
the evidence does have this effect, then the good character evidence
would not merely introduce "collateral material that is unnecessary to
a proper determination of any legitimate issue in the action. '18 7 In
this regard, it bears emphasizing that good character evidence for
truth-telling should be admitted only to rebut evidence of the wit-
ness's bad character for veracity.
6. Impeachment by Character of the Witness-Religious Beliefs
Both the Evidence Code and the Federal Rules prohibit the use
of a witness's religious beliefs (or lack thereof) to establish the wit-
ness's character for veracity or lack thereof.18 8 Neither the Evidence
Code nor the Federal Rules prohibits the use of a witness's religious
affiliations if offered for some other purpose, for example, to prove
bias or interest. 189 In California criminal cases, however, the Right-to-
Truth provision of Proposition 8 appears to repeal the Evidence
Code's prohibition on the use of a witness's religious beliefs to attack
or support the credibility of the witness.
The California and federal provisions are not identically worded.
Rule 610 expressly includes a witness's "opinions" on matters of relig-
ion in addition to the witness's religious beliefs. 190 Such opinions
would appear to be subsumed in the Evidence Code's use of "religious
beliefs."
7. Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statements
Both the Evidence Code and the Federal Rules recognize that a
witness's credibility may be impeached by evidence that the witness
187. CAL. EVID. CODE § 790 cmt. (West 1995).
188, FED. R. EVID. 610; CAL. EVID. CODE § 789.
189. FED. R. EvD. 610 advisory committee's note.
190. Id.
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has made statements that are inconsistent with the witness's testimony
at the trial.' 91
The Evidence Code and the Federal Rules abandon the common
law requirement that before witnesses can be asked about their prior
inconsistent statements, the examiner must disclose the contents of
the statement to the witness. 192 Disclosure diminishes the attack's ef-
fectiveness by removing the element of surprise and giving the dishon-
est witness an opportunity to reshape his testimony in conformity with
his earlier statement.193 But under the Federal Rules, the examiner
must show or disclose the prior inconsistent statement to opposing
counsel upon request.1 94 This provision is designed to discourage the
examiner from insinuating that a statement has been made when the
contrary is true.1 95 Under the Evidence Code, the opposing party may
invoke the judge's authority to control the mode of a witness's interro-
gation to prevent the examiner from falsely suggesting the existence
of a prior inconsistent statement. 96 Because of the importance of
preventing misconduct by counsel in this respect, consideration
should be given to adopting the federal disclosure rules.
Both the Evidence Code and the Federal Rules also reject the
common law requirement that a party confront the witness with the
prior inconsistent statement before offering extrinsic evidence of the
statement. 197 From an advocacy perspective, confronting the witness
with the prior statement has advantages. The examiner may persuade
the witness to acknowledge making the prior statement and to adopt
it as reflecting the truth. If she fails in this endeavor, the examiner
may still impeach the witness with the statement. If the witness admits
making the statement, the witness will be placed in the unenviable
position of trying to reconcile his testimony with the statement. If he
denies making the statement, the examiner will be free to offer extrin-
sic evidence of the statement. 98
In some cases, however, the examiner may not want to confront
the witness with his prior inconsistent statement. Disclosure may pre-
191. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (1) (a) advisory committee's note; CAL. EVID. CODE § 780(h).
192. FED. R. EvID. 613(a); CAL. EVID. CODE § 769.
193. CAL. EVID. CODE § 769 cmt.
194. FED. R. EVID. 613(a).
195. Id. at advisory committee's note.
196. CAL. EVID. CODE § 765(a).
197. FED. R. EWiD. 613(b) advisory committee's note; CAL. EviD. CODE § 770 law revi-
sion commission's cmt. "Extrinsic" evidence refers to proving the prior statement through
a source other than the declarant, for example, a witness who overheard the declarant
make the prior statement.
198. FED. R. EVID. 613(b); CAL. EvWD. CODE § 770(a).
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vent the effective cross-examination of several collusive witnesses. 199
Accordingly, both the Evidence Code and the Federal Rules permit
the examiner to forego confronting the witness. The examiner will
still be allowed to offer extrinsic evidence of the statement, so long as
the witness has not been excused from giving further testimony in the
action. 20 0 Since the witness remains subject to being recalled, the op-
posing party and the witness are afforded an opportunity to have the
witness explain or deny the statement before the evidence is closed.
Where the interests of justice require, both the Evidence Code
and the Federal Rules permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence of
an inconsistent statement even though the witness has been excused
and has not had an opportunity to explain or deny the statement.
20 1
As the Law Revision Commission underscores:
An absolute rule forbidding introduction of such evidence where
the specified conditions are not met may cause hardship in some
cases. For example, the party seeking to introduce the statement
may not have learned of its existence until after the witness has left
the court and is no longer available to testify. 20 2
The California provision makes explicit the right of the impeaching
party to offer extrinsic evidence of the prior statement so long as the
witness who is impeached may be recalled by the opponent before the
evidence is closed. The California provision should be retained.
California Criminal Cases. A literal interpretation of the Right-to-
Truth provision of Proposition 8 would repeal the Evidence Code lim-
itations on the use of extrinsic evidence to prove a witness's prior in-
consistent statement. Such a statement would be probative of the
witness's credibility irrespective of whether the witness has been given
an opportunity to explain or deny the statement before the close of
the evidence. California courts, however, have not decided whether
the initiative has repealed these restrictions. 20 3
Prior Inconsistent Statements and the Hearsay Rule. In Califor-
nia, a prior inconsistent statement may be received for the truth of the
matter asserted as well as to impeach the witness. 20 4 In federal court,
however, the statement can be received for the truth of the matter
stated only if it was made "under oath subject to the penalty of perjury
199. FED. R. EvID. 613(b) advisory committee's note; CAL. EVID. CODE § 770 cmt.
200. CAL. EVID. CODE § 770(b).
201. Id. § 770; FED. R. EVID. 613(b).
202. CAL. EVID. CODE § 770 law revision commission's cmt.
203. A post-Proposition 8 decision discussing the need to give the witness an opportu-
nity to explain or deny the statement fails to mention the impact of Proposition 8 on this
requirement. People v. Garcia, 273 Cal. Rptr. 666, 669B70 (Ct. App. 1990).
204. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235.
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at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition. ' 20 5 If the
statement was not made under these circumstances, it can be used
only to impeach the witness. The Federal Rule originally prescribed by
the United States Supreme Court was identical to the Evidence Code
provision.20 6 Congress, however, placed the limitation on the substan-
tive use of prior inconsistent statements because of concern about
their reliability.20 7 California appellate decisions do not bear out Con-
gress's concerns. The California hearsay exception should therefore
be retained.
Prior Inconsistent Statements and Former Testimony. Some-
times, a witness who has given helpful information to the police re-
cants when called to testify at the preliminary hearing. A witness, for
example, who tells the police that the accused was the assailant may
claim at the preliminary hearing that she did not see the assailant.
Under such circumstances, the prosecution may call to the stand the
officer who took the statement to repeat the witness's statement. In
California, the statement may be received to impeach the witness and,
perhaps more importantly, to prove that the accused was the
assailant. 208
If the witness then fails to appear at the trial, may the prosecution
offer the officer's preliminary hearing testimony for its truth under
the hearsay exception for former testimony?20 9 If at the preliminary
hearing the witness had identified the accused as her assailant, then
that portion of her testimony would be admissible against the accused
at the trial under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule.
But where, as in this example, the witness recants her out of court
identification at the preliminary hearing, then her out of court state-
ment to the officer will not be admissible for its truth at the trial in the
absence of a hearsay exception for that statement.210 Since the witness
does not appear at the trial, the use of the hearsay exception for prior
inconsistent statements is problematic. Under sections 770 and 1235,
a prior inconsistent statement may be offered for its truth only if the
205. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (1) (A).
206. Id. at advisory committee's note (regarding the 1997 amendments).
207. Id.
208. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1235.
209. For a discussion of the admissibility of former testimony, see MINDEZ, THIRD EDI-
TION, supra note 68, § 11.01.
210. A hearsay declarant may be impeached with a statement made by the declarant
that is inconsistent with the hearsay declaration received in evidence. CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1202. However, unless the declaration falls within an exception, it may not be received
for the truth of the matter stated. For a discussion of this point, see MPNDEZ, THmR EDI-
TION, supra note 68, § 15.13.
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witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the statement
before the close of evidence. 211 A hearsay declarant who does not ap-
pear at the trial is not afforded such an opportunity.21 2 To help solve
this problem, section 1294 of the Evidence Code allows the prosecu-
tion at the trial to offer the witness's statement to the officer for the
truth of the matter asserted after offering the witness's recantation at
the preliminary hearing.21 3
At the trial, the prosecution is limited to proving the witness's
former testimony by videotape or transcript. If at the preliminary
hearing the inconsistent statement was offered through a videotape
taken by the police, then the prosecution may offer the videotape at
the trial. If the statement was offered through the testimony of the
officer who took the statement, then the prosecution may offer that
portion of the transcript of the preliminary hearing containing the
statement. 2
14
The accused may object to the introduction of the inconsistent
statement on the gr6unds that the statement to the officer was not
properly received at the preliminary hearing as a prior inconsistent
statement, or that the videotape or transcript does not qualify as for-
mer testimony. 215 If the statement is received at the trial, the accused
retains the right to call and cross-examine the witnesses who testified
about the witness's prior inconsistent statement.216
The Federal Rules do not appear to provide a solution to this
problem.217 Therefore, the California provision should be retained.
8. Supporting Credibility by Prior Consistent Statements
Section 791 allows a party to support the credibility of witnesses
with statements by the witnesses that are consistent with their testi-
211. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 770(a), 1235. Multiple hearsay is admissible if each hearsay
statement meets the requirements of an exception to the hearsay rule. Id. § 1201. This rule
is unavailable because the inconsistent statement does not meet the requirements of the
exception for inconsistent statements. See id. §§ 770, 1235.
212. To satisfy the inconsistency requirement of the exception, the prosecution first
would have to offer that portion of the witness's preliminary hearing testimony at which
the witness denied having seen the assailant. See id. § 770.
213. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1294(b).
214. Id. § 1294(a) (2).
215. Id. § 1294(b).
216. Id.
217. Indeed, under the rules a prior inconsistent statement needs to be made under
oath in some kind of proceeding in order to be received for the truth. See FED R. EVID.
801 (d)(1)(C). The exception for statements of identification presuppose the presence of
the hearsay declarant for cross-examination. See id.
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mony if one of two conditions is satisfied. 218 First, if the witness was
impeached with a prior inconsistent statement, the witness may be re-
habilitated with a consistent statement, so long as the statement was
made before the alleged inconsistent statement. 219 Second, where the
witness has been expressly or impliedly charged with fabricating his
testimony or allowing bias or other improper motive to shape his testi-
mony, the witness can be rehabilitated with a prior consistent state-
ment if the statement was made before the motive to fabricate or
other improper motive is alleged to have arisen. 220
California Criminal Cases. As has been discussed, a literal inter-
pretation of the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8
repeals almost all statutory barriers and limitations on the use of rele-
vant evidence in criminal cases.2 2 1 Evidence that a witness has made
statements that are consistent with his testimony is as probative of the
witness's credibility as is evidence that the witness has made state-
ments that are inconsistent with his testimony. A witness's credibility,
after all, becomes an issue the moment the witness takes the stand.
Accordingly, a literal application of Proposition 8 would repeal sec-
tion 791 and permit parties in criminal proceedings to offer prior con-
sistent statements to support the witness's credibility even though the
witness's credibility has not been attacked.
Under Proposition 8, a judge may still exclude relevant evidence
under section 352 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
such concerns as waste of time. 2 2 2 A judge could thus find that the
probative value of prior consistent statements that fail to satisfy the
conditions of section 791 is so slight so as not to justify the time
needed to receive them. Whether a judge will use section 352 to ex-
clude such statements in a given trial cannot be known. The judge's
decision may well depend on her assessment of the need for the evi-
dence and the time required to receive it. The point, though, is that
the certainty provided by section 791 may now have been replaced by
the necessarily imprecise standards of section 352. To be sure, neither
the California Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals has decided
whether Proposition 8 repeals section 791, and cases decided since
218. CAL. EVID. CODE § 791.
219. Id. § 791(a).
220. Id. § 791(b).
221. See discussion supra Part II.B.
222. For an extended discussion of judicial discretion to exclude relevant evidence
under section 352 after Proposition 8, see MtNDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra note 68, § 2.11.
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the adoption of the initiative in June 1982 assume the continuing va-
lidity of the section. 223
Prior Consistent Statements and the Hearsay Rule. Prior consis-
tent statements that are admissible under section 791 may also be re-
ceived for the truth of the matter stated under section 1236.224
Prior Consistent Statements Under the Federal Rules. Under the
Federal Rules, a witness's prior consistent statements may also be re-
ceived to support the witness's credibility as well as for the truth of the
matter asserted. 225 A major difference between the Evidence Code
and the Federal Rules is that under the Federal Rules a prior consis-
tent statement may be received only to rebut an express or implied
charge of recent fabrication or improper influence. 226 The Federal
Rules do not contain a provision equivalent to section 791 (a) which
permits the use of a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate a witness
if the witness has been impeached by a prior inconsistent statement
and the consistent statement was made before the inconsistent one.
The Evidence Code's additional ground for admission has served Cali-
fornia well and should be retained.
Another difference between the Evidence Code and the Federal
Rules is that the Evidence Code makes clear that, if offered to rebut
an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper mo-
tive, the prior consistent statement can be received only if it was made
before the improper motive arose. The Federal Rules are not explicit
in this respect. The United States Supreme Court, however, has inter-
preted the Federal Rules as requiring the rehabilitating party to show
that the declarant made the consistent statement before the alleged
fabrication or improper motive arose. 227 The Evidence Code's express
requirement should be retained.
9. Impeaching One's Own Witnesses
The Evidence Code and the Federal Rules repeal the common
law rule prohibiting a party from impeaching his own witnesses. Both
223. See, e.g., People v. Hayes, 802 P.2d 376, 394 (Cal. 1990); People v. Frank, 798 P.2d
1215, 1224 (Cal. 1990); People v. Andrews, 776 P.2d 285, 289-91 (Cal. 1989).
224. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1236.
225. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). For an extended discussion of the hearsay aspects of
prior consistent statements under the Federal Rules, see MtNDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra
note 68, § 8.06.
226. FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(1)(B).
227. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158-60 (1995).
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provide that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party,
including the party calling the witness. 228 The provisions are identical.
III. Examination of Witnesses
A. The Judge's General Powers
Except as otherwise provided by law, a California trial judge has
discretion to regulate the order of proof.229 Discretion includes "rea-
sonable control over the mode of interrogation of a witness so as to
make such interrogation as rapid, as distinct, and as effective for the
ascertainment of the truth, as may be, and to protect the witness from
undue harassment and embarrassment." 230
A federal judge has similar powers over the interrogation of wit-
nesses. 231 But, under the Evidence Code, a California judge owes child
witnesses special solicitude.
With a witness under the age of fourteen, the court shall take
special care to protect him from undue harassment and embarrass-
ment and to restrict the unnecessary repetition of questions.232 The
court shall take special care to insure that questions are stated in a
form that is appropriate to the age of the witness. 23 3 "The court may
in the interests ofjustice, on objection by a party, forbid the asking of
a question that is in a form that is not reasonably likely to be under-
stood by a person of the age of the witness."234
Given the increase in prosecutions involving children, the special
provision of the California Evidence Code should be retained.
B. The Order and Mode of Interrogation
The Federal Rules contain only two provisions regarding the
mode of interrogation. Rule 611 (b) provides that cross-examination
"should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and
matters affecting the credibility of the witness."235 The judge, how-
ever, is given discretion to permit inquiry into additional matters as if
on direct examination. 236 In addition, Rule 611(c) prohibits the use
228. FED. R. EVID. 607; CAL. EVWD. CODE § 785.
229. CAL. EVID. CODE § 320.
230. Id. § 765(a).
231. FED. R. EVID. 611(a)(1)-(3).
232. CAL. EviD. CODE § 765(b).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. FED. R. EVID. 611(b).
236. Id.
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of leading questions on direct examination unless needed to develop
the witness's testimony. 237 Rule 611 (c) authorizes the use of leading
questions on cross-examination and specifically permits their use on
direct examination when a party calls a hostile witness or a witness
identified with an adverse party.23 8
The provisions of the Evidence Code are much more detailed.
First, unlike the Federal Rules, the Evidence Code defines a leading
question as one "that suggests to the witness the answer that the exam-
ining party desires." 239 The Evidence Code also specifies when leading
questions may be asked (cross- and recross-examination) and may not
be asked (direct and redirect examination). 240 Like federal judges,
California judges have discretion to deviate from these rules in the
interest of justice.241 The Evidence Code, however, specifically autho-
rizes California judges in the interests of justice to permit leading
questions to be asked of child witnesses in prosecutions for various
forms of child abuse. 242
Second, unlike the Federal Rules, the Evidence Code specifies
the order of examination of witnesses and defines each phase. The
order consists of "direct examination, cross-examination, redirect ex-
amination, recross-examination, and continuing thereafter by redirect
and recross-examination." 243 Further, "[u]nless for good cause the
court otherwise directs, each phase of the examination of a witness
must be concluded before the succeeding phase begins."244
Direct examination is defined as "the first examination of a wit-
ness upon a matter that is not within the scope of a previous examina-
tion of the witness." 245 Cross-examination is defined as "the
examination of witness by a party other than the direct examiner
upon a matter that is within the scope of the direct examination of the
witness."246 Redirect examination is defined as "an examination of a
witness by the direct examiner subsequent to the cross-examination of
237. FED. R. EVID. 611(c).
238. Id.
239. CAL. EVID. CODE § 764.
240. CAL. EVID. CODE § 767(a) (West Supp. 2004).
241. Id.
242. Id. § 767(b).
243. CAL. EVID. CODE § 772 (West 1995). The court may prohibit the use of leading
questions on cross-examination "where the witness is biased in favor of the cross-examiner
and would be unduly susceptible to the influence of questions that suggested the answer."
CAL. EVID. CODE § 767 cmt.
244. Id. § 772(b).
245. Id. § 760.
246. Id. § 761.
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the witness. '247 Recross-examination is defined as "an examination of
a witness by a cross-examiner subsequent to a redirect examination of
the witness."248 Although cross-examination, redirect examination,
and recross-examination are generally limited to matters within the
scope of the previous examination, judges have discretion to allow
parties to examine the witness about matters beyond the scope of the
previous examination. 249
The Evidence Code contains detailed rules regarding the exami-
nation of an adverse party or a person identified with an adverse party.
As a general rule, a party or a person identified with that party may be
called and examined as if under cross-examination by any adverse
party.250 But the party's own counsel may cross-examine the party only
as if under redirect examination. 251 The same limitation applies to the
cross-examination of a person identified with a party.252 Other rules
specify when a person is identified with a party.253
The Evidence Code's detailed rules on the examination of wit-
nesses are helpful to the bench and bar, and should therefore be
retained.
C. Court Witnesses
Both the Evidence Code and the Federal Rules authorize judges
to call witnesses on their own motion or upon motion of any party.254
The judge may examine the witnesses and the parties may cross-ex-
amine them. 255 In addition, the parties may object to the judge's ques-
tions and the witnesses's answers. 256 In jury trials, however, a party
under the Federal Rules may object to the judge's questions or the
witness's answers at the next available opportunity when the jury is not
present.257 This provision is designed to avoid the prejudice that
might ensue if a party is forced to object to the judge's examination of
witnesses in the presence of the jurors.258 The Evidence Code should
be amended to include this protection.
247. Id. § 762.
248. Id. § 763.
249. Id. § 772(c).
250. Id. § 776(a).
251. Id. § 776(b) (1).
252. Id. § 776(b) (2).
253. Id. § 776(d).
254. FED. R. EVID. 614(a); CAL. EVID. CODE § 775.
255. FED. R. EVID. 614(a)-(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 775.
256. FED. R. EVID. 614(c); CAL. EVID. CODE § 775.
257. FED. R. EVID. 614(c).
258. Id. at advisory committee's note.
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D. Exclusion of Witnesses
Both the Evidence Code and the Federal Rules seek to discourage
fabrication on the stand by allowing judges "to put witnesses under
the rule." At the request of a party or on its own motion, the court
may order witnesses to be excluded so that they cannot hear the testi-
mony of other witnesses.2 59 Under the Evidence Code and the Federal
Rules, the following witnesses cannot be excluded: a party who is a
natural person, or an officer or employee of a party not a natural per-
son and designated as its representative by its attorney.260 In addition,
the Federal Rules forbid the exclusion of "a person whose presence is
shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's
cause" and "a person authorized by statute to be present."
26 1
A person authorized by statute to be present cannot be excluded
from the proceedings. The California decisions, however, do not ap-
pear to justify adding the Federal Rules' extra category forbidding the
exclusion of an essential person. Almost all cases construing the right
to exclude witnesses were decided prior to the adoption of the Evi-
dence Code,26 2 and the framers, who took these cases into account,
2 63
did not include the additional category found in the Federal Rules.
E. Refreshing Recollection
Sometimes, a witness is unable to answer a question or to answer
it fully because of poor recollection. Whenever that occurs, the exam-
ining lawyer is allowed to try to refresh the witness's recollection of
the matters inquired. If the lawyer succeeds in refreshing the witness's
recollection, the lawyer is entitled to have the witness answer the ques-
tion left unanswered.
The Evidence Code and the Federal Rules are quite liberal with
respect to the sources that may be used to refresh a witness's recollec-
tion: anything, including a writing, can be used. 264 If a writing is used,
the lawyer should ask the witness to read the writing to herself.26 5
Once the witness has done that, then the lawyer should ask the witness
whether her recollection has been refreshed with respect to the sub-
259. FED. R. EVID. 615; CAL. EviD. CODE § 777(a).
260. FED. R. EVID. 615; CAL. EwiD. CODE § 777(b)-(c).
261. FED. R. EVID. 615.
262. CAL. EvD. CODE § 777 (effective Jan. 1, 1967).
263. Id. at law revision commission's cmt.
264. FED. R. EVID. 612; CAL. EviD. CODE § 771.
265. See MtNDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra note 68, § 8.09.
Winter 2005] WITNESSES
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
ject matter to which the witness claimed insufficient recall. 266 If the
witness answers in the affirmative, the lawyer may then ask the witness
to answer the question that was pending. 267
Before the witness may be asked any questions about the writing,
the opposing party is entitled to examine it.268 If the witness's recollec-
tion is in fact refreshed by the writing, the opposing party may use the
writing in cross-examining the witness and may introduce such parts
as are pertinent to the witness's testimony.269
If a witness uses a writing to refresh her recollection prior to testi-
fying, then in California the writing must be produced at the hearing
upon the request of the opposing party. 270 If the writing is not pro-
duced, then a California judge must strike the witness's testimony un-
less the writing (1) is not in the possession or control of the witness or
the party eliciting the testimony, and (2) was not reasonably
procurable by the party through the use of the court's process or
other available means.271
In federal court, the adverse party is entitled to have the writing
produced only if the court in its discretion determines that produc-
tion is necessary in the interests of justice. 272 If the writing is not pro-
duced, a federal judge has greater latitude than a California judge to
impose sanctions. The Federal Rules state, "The court shall make any
orderjustice requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecu-
tion elects not to comply, the order shall be one striking the testimony
or, if the court in its discretion determines that the interests ofjustice
so require, declaring a mistrial."273 In civil cases, the federal judge
may in addition impose such remedies as contempt and finding issues
against the offender.274
F. Other Provisions
The Evidence Code contains four provisions relating to witnesses
not found in the Federal Rules. First, a California witness who has
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. CAL. EVID. CODE § 768(b).
269. FED. R. EVD. 612; CAL. EVID. CODE § 771(b).
270. FED. R. EvID. 612; CAL. EVID. CODE § 771.
271. CAL. EVID. CODE § 771(c).
272. FED. R. EVID. 612.
273. Id.
274. Id. at advisory committee's note.
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been excused from giving further testimony may not be recalled with-
out leave of the court,275 which is discretionary. 276
Second, a California witness must give answers that are responsive
to tne questions asked.277 Answers that are not must be stricken on
motion of any party.278 This provision is useful for controlling wit-
nesses who are more intent on telling their side of the story than in
responding to the questions posed.279 Federal practice is to allow an
adverse party to strike an unresponsive answer only if it is also irrele-
vant. The California provision is more effective in controlling the re-
calcitrant witness and should be retained.
Third, the Evidence Code provides that at the trial a witness may
be heard "only in the presence and subject to the examination of all
the parties to the action, if they choose to attend and examine." 280
This provision is not limited to criminal cases, where the accused is
the beneficiary of the Sixth Amendment's Right of Confrontation, 281
but applies as well to all parties in both civil and criminal trials.282 The
provision is consistent with the ideal conditions for taking testimony-
under oath and subject to cross-examination in the presence of the
finder of fact 28 3 -and should be retained.
Fourth, in examining a witness about a writing, it is not necessary
to show, read, or disclose any part of the writing to the witness.284 But
if a writing is shown to a witness, all parties to the action must be given
an opportunity to inspect it before any question concerning the writ-
ing can be asked of the witness.285 These provisions are useful to the
examining and non-examining parties, and therefore they should be
retained.
275. CAL. EVID. CODE § 778.
276. Id.
277. Id. § 766.
278. Id.
279. See MtNDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra note 68, § 1.04.
280. CAL. EVID. CODE § 711.
281. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
282. CAL. EVID. CODE § 711.
283. MtNDEZ, THIRD EDITION, supra note 68, § 5.01.
284. CAL. EVD. CODE § 768(a).
285. Id. § 768(b).
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